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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TAKING AIM AT “FAKE NEWS”: BRAZIL’S LEGISLATIVE
AGENDA FOR ONLINE DEMOCRACY
JEFFREY OMARI*
ABSTRACT
Like the United States, Brazil has recently been plagued by a crisis in online
disinformation. After the country’s 2018 presidential elections, many Brazilians
experienced a shock similar to that experienced by U.S. voters after the 2016
election of Donald Trump. The shock was the result of the election of Brazil’s
far-right wing Jair Bolsonaro and his striking political ascent, which was fueled
by supporters who mobilized online disinformation campaigns for Bolsonaro’s
competitive advantage. During Brazil’s 2018 elections, Bolsonaro’s supporters
employed these disinformation campaigns, which often preyed on Brazil’s poor,
to gain a voting base in disadvantaged communities. Moreover, these
disinformation networks created a polarized digital climate, helped incite the
rapid spread of “fake news” in Brazil, and led to the rise of the extremist
Bolsonaro.
To mitigate this problem of digital malfeasance, along with issues of digital
inequality and data privacy concerns, the Brazilian government has recently
advanced a series of internet laws. These laws seek to further democracy by
advancing digital access and inclusion, promoting data privacy, and curbing the
spread of online disinformation. This Essay examines the social, political, and
historical context that led to the pursuit of these internet laws, how each law
builds upon the foundations of its predecessor and discusses the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each. In addition to this analysis, this Essay places
a special emphasis on Brazil’s recent swell in online disinformation, and how
these internet laws have attempted the seemingly contradictory effort of
promoting digital access while simultaneously curbing the spread of fake news.
In attempting to advance democracy through internet governance, this Essay
argues that discourse should focus not only on legislation and policymaking, but
also on grassroots efforts that advance effective inclusion on digital platforms
to help further cyber civil rights.

* Legal anthropologist and Assistant Professor at Gonzaga University School of Law. This author
is grateful to Michelle Oberman, Matthew Erie, Jason B. Scott, and Honey Crawford for their
thoughtful comments and feedback on earlier versions of this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION
Similar to the United States, Brazil has recently been plagued by a crisis in
online disinformation. 1 After Donald Trump’s successful 2016 U.S. presidential
bid, which was bolstered by Cambridge Analytica and its misappropriation of
Facebook user data, 2 Brazil reached an apex in social media disinformation
during its 2018 presidential elections. During those elections, Brazilians
witnessed a bevy of misleading online information that was facilitated not by
Facebook per se, but by Facebook’s corporate subsidiary, the messaging
application WhatsApp. 3 Because rates for sending and receiving short message
service (“SMS”) messages are very expensive in Brazil, the web-based
WhatsApp offers an inexpensive alternative. 4 In recent years, Brazilians have
thus migrated to the application, which is used by more than 120 million people 5
in the social-media savvy country. 6 Moreover, because WhatsApp allows its
users to join large-scale messaging chains, the application has become a prime
social-media instrument for targeted political disinformation campaigns in
Brazil. This fact is especially true among supporters of that country’s far-right
president, Jair Bolsonaro. 7
While Bolsonaro supporters have embraced the spread of disinformation
through platforms like WhatsApp, many Brazilians are concerned about the
ongoing dissemination of online disinformation and how it might shape the
country’s next presidential contest in 2022. These concerns have been amplified
by the disastrous effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has ravaged the
1. Drawing from Brazilian media studies scholar David Nemer, this Essay defines
“disinformation” as the spread of false information with the intent to deceive or mislead.
Accordingly, “misinformation” refers to information that may be false or inaccurate but is not
generally intended to mislead. “Fake news” is thus an umbrella term that includes both
disinformation and misinformation. See DAVID NEMER, TECHNOLOGY OF THE OPPRESSED:
INEQUALITY AND THE DIGITAL MUNDANE IN THE FAVELAS OF BRAZIL (2022).
2. Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of
Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cam
bridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html.
3. David Nemer, WhatsApp is Radicalizing the Right in Bolsonaro’s Brazil, HUFF. POST
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/brazil-jair-bolsonaro-whatsapp_n_5d542b0de4b
05fa9df088ccc; Letícia Cesarino, On Digital Populism in Brazil, POLAR: POL. & LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY REV. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://polarjournal.org/2019/04/15/on-jair-bolsonaros-dig
ital-populism/.
4. Jeffrey Omari, Is Facebook the Internet? Ethnographic Perspectives on Open Internet
Governance in Brazil, 45 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1093, 1102 (2020).
5. Nemer, supra note 3.
6. Julie Ruvolo, Why Brazil is Actually Winning the Internet, BUZZFEED (June 29, 2014),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/jruv/why-brazil-is-actually-winning-the-internet.
7. See, e.g., Nemer supra note 3; Cesarino, supra note 3; Robert Muggah et al., Digital
misinformation not only threatens Brazil’s 2020 municipal elections, it undermines democracy,
OPENDEMOCRACY (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/digi
tal-misinformation-threatens-brazil-2020-municipal-elections-undermine-democracy/.
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Brazilian people, and continued distress over an economic crisis brought upon
by the pandemic. 8
In addition to the recent economic concerns caused by the pandemic, Brazil
has a lengthy reputation of vast socioeconomic inequality. 9 To help combat such
inequality, internet access and inclusion are necessary for citizens to gainfully
engage in civil society. 10 Indeed, across the globe, the internet is an
“indispensable tool for realizing a range of human rights.” 11 For these reasons,
the Brazilian government has turned to internet governance 12 to help mitigate
many of its societal inequities. 13 In doing so, the country has recently advanced
a series of internet laws with the aim of furthering democracy by cultivating
digital access and inclusion, advancing data privacy, and curbing the spread of
online disinformation. Accordingly, this Essay provides a sequential
examination of Brazil’s three recent internet laws: (1) the Marco Civil da
Internet––Civil Rights Framework of the Internet, or MCI, (2) the Lei Geral de
Proteção de Dados Pessoais, or LGPD, and (3) the Internet Freedom,
Responsibility, and Transparency Law––widely known as the “Fake News” Bill.
While exploring the requisite social, political, and historical context that led
to the pursuit of these internet laws, this Essay investigates how each law builds
upon the foundations of its predecessor and discusses the relative strengths and
weaknesses of each. In addition to this analysis, this Essay examines how
8. Muggah et al., supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., JAMES HOLSTON, INSURGENT CITIZENSHIP: DISJUNCTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
AND MODERNITY IN BRAZIL 19 (2008).
10. BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT STAN. L. SCH., NET
NEUTRALITY AND ZERO-RATING (2015). This white paper report was filed with the Federal
Communications Commission along with an ex parte letter on February 19, 2015.
11. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report on the Special Rappoteur on the Promotion and Protection
on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27, at 85 (2011).
12. According to Laura DeNardis, internet governance involves a broadly conceived
orientation that takes shape in four areas: (1) critical internet resources; (2) intellectual property
rights; (3) communication rights; and (4) cybersecurity. Critical internet resources relate to internet
protocol address space and management. Intellectual property rights refer to ownership interests in
trademarks, patents, and copyrights. Communication rights, conversely, involve freedom of speech,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, as well as data privacy concerns. Meanwhile,
because of the open and worldwide aspect of the internet, DeNardis notes that cybersecurity
involves a wide variety of concerns and must include input from national governments, the private
sector, individual users, and technical communities. See LAURA DENARDIS, PROTOCOL POLITICS:
THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE 14–17, 19–20 (2009). Because this Essay
addresses regulatory provisions that relate to internet access, net neutrality, online privacy, and
content moderation issues, the internet governance discussion herein concerns the communications
rights aspect of DeNardis’s definition. For an analysis of the significance of communications rights
and policymaking, see Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 FED.
COMM. L.J. 205, 206, 209, 227 (2010).
13. See, e.g., Jeffrey Omari, Digital Access Amongst the Marginalized: Democracy and
Internet Governance in Rio de Janeiro, 41 POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 277, 277
(2018).
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Bolsonaro’s supporters employed online disinformation campaigns, which often
manipulated Brazil’s poor, to gain a voting base in disadvantaged communities.
Such communities were thus subject to state-sponsored efforts to advance digital
access (the MCI) and to targeted online disinformation campaigns. Through
examining internet legislation in this relevant sociopolitical context, this Essay
shows how Brazil’s internet laws have attempted the seemingly contradictory
effort of promoting digital access (the MCI) while simultaneously curbing the
spread of online disinformation (the “Fake News” Bill). This Essay argues that,
in attempting to advance democratic standards for cyberspace, discourse should
focus not only on legislation and policymaking, but also on grassroots efforts
that support effective inclusion on digital platforms to help further cyber civil
rights. 14
I. SETTING THE STAGE: THE MARCO CIVIL DA INTERNET
This author spent the entirety of 2015 conducting ethnographic fieldwork in
both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil. 15 At that time, the country was fresh
off the heels of successfully hosting the 2014 World Cup, and there was great
anticipation for the upcoming 2016 Olympic Games in Rio. Because of these
mega-events, there was a considerable amount of technological development
taking place in the country’s urban areas. As discussed elsewhere, this
technological development was intended, in part, to increase digital access and
inclusion among Brazil’s marginalized populations. 16 The lack of such access
and inclusion, and the social and digital inequalities this disparity facilitates, has
been a longstanding issue in Brazil. Indeed, social and digital inequalities have
restricted the political engagement of Brazil’s marginalized populations. 17 This
socioeconomic stratification was mapped onto social media as the social
networks of rich and poor Brazilians did not often overlap. 18
Driven in part by an effort to mitigate these digital inequalities, 19 the
Brazilian government enacted its visionary Civil Rights Framework for the
14. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009) (noting that
because of the aggregative and disaggregative qualities of cyberspace, internet governance raises
important civil rights issues that require a fundamentally pro-regulatory cyber civil rights agenda).
15. Although this Essay is not ethnographic in the traditional sense, it remains informed and
inspired by a collective eighteen months of fieldwork conducted in both Rio de Janeiro and São
Paulo, Brazil, between 2012 and 2015. The focus of this fieldwork was the various sociocultural,
political, and legal interests at play regarding the Brazilian government’s attempt to codify a civil
right to internet access.
16. Omari, supra note 13.
17. David Nemer & Michael Tsikerdekis, Political Engagement and ICTs: Internet Use in
Marginalized Communities, 68 JASIST 1539, 1540 (2017).
18. Id.
19. The term “digital divide” assumes that by closing the gap in digital access, digital
technologies are beneficial to all citizens. It thus references access to digital technology without
any consideration for its effective use. This author therefore employs the term “digital inequalities,”
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Internet, the MCI, in 2014. 20 The MCI codifies democratic principles of internet
openness by advancing a civil right to internet access, protecting net neutrality,
providing preliminary guidelines for data privacy, and protecting internet
intermediaries. 21 This law has been widely championed by scholars for its
democratizing potential. 22 Indeed, a principal founder of the MCI, Brazilian
lawyer and legal scholar Ronaldo Lemos, claimed the law’s enactment was “a
victory for democracy.” 23
As its name suggests, the MCI’s objective is to create a civil rights
framework for the regulation of cyberspace. This framework is based upon
principles established by Brazil’s Comitê Gestor da Internet (“Internet Steering
Committee” or “CGI”), which consults the Brazilian Congress in developing
internet legislation. 24 At its core, however, the MCI is based on the three
principles of privacy, human rights, and freedom of expression, which are
thought to provide direction for the Brazilian government in advancing internet
legislation. 25 Engaging in both rights-based concepts (e.g., data privacy and
freedom of expression) and technical concepts (e.g., net neutrality), which are
both “explicitly linked to civil rights,” 26 demonstrates the sophistication of the
CGI in furthering the MCI’s objective. Moreover, these concepts connect the
law to the work of scholars like Lawrence Lessig, who argue for the necessity
of code in both political and technical terms. 27
Because of its commitment to advancing cyber civil rights, 28 the MCI is, in
theory, an idyllic model of democratic internet legislation. In practice, however,
the objectives of the MCI have been stifled by the disjunctions that exist in
Brazil’s democratic institutions. 29 These disjunctions relate to the country’s
systemic inequities and to its recent political saga.

which is considered more practical. See Jo Tacchi, Digital Engagement: Voice and Participation
in Development, in DIGITAL ANTHROPOLOGY 225, 227 (Heather A. Horst & Daniel Miller eds.,
2012).
20. For a detailed history of the MCI, see Daniel Arnaudo, Brazil, the Internet and the Digital
Bill of Rights: Reviewing the State of Brazilian Internet Governance, IGARAPÉ INST., Apr. 2017, at
2, https://igarape.org.br/o-brasil-e-o-marco-civil-da-internet/.
21. Omari, supra note 13, at 280.
22. See, e.g., Id. at 38.
23. Carlos Affonso Pereira de Souza et al., Understanding Brazil’s Internet Bill of Rights,
INSTITUTO DE TECNOLOGIA E SOCIEDADE DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2015.
24. Arnaudo, supra note 20, at 5.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 15.
27. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
28. Citron, supra note 14.
29. See Omari, supra note 13, at 278 (noting that violence and informal governance in Brazil’s
disadvantaged communities index broader disjunctions in contemporary Brazilian democracy. In
these communities, such sociopolitical realities create corresponding disjunctions in the MCI’s
pledge of a civil right to internet access for all Brazilians).
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The MCI was enacted under the guidance of Brazil’s former president,
Dilma Rousseff (widely known as Dilma) and her Progressive Worker’s Party
(“PT”). 30 The PT controlled the Brazilian executive from 2003 until 2016. 31
During this time, a prime aim of the PT was to reduce the socioeconomic
inequality that has plagued Brazil for decades. 32 As a part of that mitigating
effort, Dilma and the PT developed policies like the MCI “to address national
issues of democracy and inequality” 33 in Brazil.
Sustaining momentum for the PT’s democratic objectives seemingly came
to a halt in 2016, when the Brazilian government experienced a radical political
shift to the right. During that year, Dilma was impeached 34 and removed from
office on charges of manipulating the country’s budget. 35 Dilma’s former VicePresident, Michel Temer, assumed office and challenged many of Dilma’s
progressive policies until the 2018 election of the far-right Bolsonaro. While
Dilma's successors (Temer from 2016–2018; Bolsonaro from 2019–present)
have ushered in more conservative and even controversial political agendas,
through the enactment of the MCI, Dilma and her PT allies “created a strong
legacy of open [and] democratic” 36 internet governance. These disparate
political trajectories nevertheless illustrate the recursive trope of politics in
internet policymaking and the difficulty of maintaining continuity in Brazil’s
ongoing legislative efforts to advance internet governance.

30. See Omari, supra note 4, at 1107 (illustrating that through embracing open-source
ideology, challenging international patent norms, and promoting open access to copyrighted music,
the PT’s progressive values in matters of technology and intellectual property long predate the
MCI’s 2014 enactment).
31. Omari, supra note 13.
32. Id.
33. Omari, supra note 4, at 1099.
34. Dilma’s impeachment was the result of an ongoing federal criminal investigation known
as Operação Lava Jato (Operation Car Wash). The probe initially involved money laundering, but
morphed into an expansive investigation involving Petrobras, Brazil’s largest public oil company
headquartered in Rio de Janeiro. Executives from the oil company allegedly accepted bribes in
return for rewarding inflated contracts to several of Brazil’s largest construction firms. Because the
investigation challenges a long system of impunity for the elite, the corruption scandal grew to
implicate many of the most prominent politicians and executives in Brazil and Latin America more
broadly. Because Dilma was a board member of Petrobras during the time of the alleged
corruption, she became a subject of the criminal inquiry. Jeffrey Omari, Democracy and Digital
Technology: Internet Governance and Social In/exclusion in Rio de Janeiro (Sept. 2018) (Ph.D.
dissertation, UC Santa Cruz) (on file with eScholarship.org), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6fx
857q5#main.
35. Jonathan Watts, Dilma Rousseff: Brazilian Congress Votes to Impeach the President,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/18/dilma-rousseff-con
gress-impeach-brazilian-president.
36. Arnaudo, supra note 20, at 17.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

TAKING AIM AT “FAKE NEWS”

121

II. NEXT STEPS: THE LGPD
Internet governance issues related to data protection and online privacy have
been an ongoing concern in Brazil. Indeed, the MCI was made a constitutional
priority after Edward Snowden’s 2013 disclosures regarding U.S. espionage. 37
Snowden’s disclosures of a global U.S. surveillance program revealed evidence
of spying on Brazilian citizens, executives, and government officials. 38 In a
September 2013 address to the United Nations, former President Dilma Rousseff
condemned this spying by “calling it a breach of democracy and international
law.” 39 Because Article 7 of the MCI protects the right to privacy in Brazil and
was a “direct response to Snowden’s revelations of NSA spying,” 40 the spying
disclosures expedited the MCI’s 2014 enactment. However, while advancing the
right to privacy, scholars have argued that the MCI lacks sufficient language for
the protection of user data. 41 Dilma’s attempt to implement legislation with
specific data privacy protections was frustrated by her 2016 impeachment. 42
Upon her removal from office, the Temer administration began developing its
own data protection law. 43 The result of this development is the LGPD.
While the MCI provides the democratic principles necessary to guide the
country in internet governance, the LGPD provides specific regulations
concerning data privacy. Sanctioned by the administration of former president
Temer in 2018, the LGPD is a comprehensive data protection law that aims to
regulate and safeguard the personal data of all individuals residing in Brazil. 44
Moreover, it provides a framework for sharing, collecting, storing, and handling
the personal data managed by various companies and organizations. 45 Modeled
after the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, the LGPD seeks
to provide clarity in Brazil’s data protection realm, which is currently
experiencing great legal uncertainty. 46 Because Brazil has been a hotspot in
reported Covid-19 cases, there has been great debate regarding the use of
personal data for digital contact tracing. 47 Brazilian privacy experts and other
industry stakeholders view the LGPD as a legal mechanism that could help

37. See, e.g., Arnaudo, supra note 20; Omari, supra note 13, at 279.
38. Arnaudo, supra note 20, at 6.
39. Omari, supra note 13, at 279–80.
40. Arnaudo, supra note 20, at 8.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id.
44. Andrada Coos, Brazil’s New Data Protection Law, ENDPOINT PROTECTOR (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.endpointprotector.com/blog/about-brazils-new-data-protection-law/.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The Brazilian Report, The Impact of Postponing Brazil’s Data Protection Law, WILSON
CTR. (May 4, 2020), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/impact-postponing-brazils-data-pro
tection-law.
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ensure the responsible use of personal data by the Brazilian government and
other organizations in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic. 48 Although the LGPD
was approved by the Brazilian government in 2018, as of this writing, the law
will not go into effect until the second half of 2021 because of a provisional
measure that delays its applicability. 49
Transnational in scope, the LGPD applies to any company located in Brazil
and to foreign companies that process the personal data of individuals residing
in Brazil. 50 Enforcement and compliance issues will be overseen by Brazil’s
new, presidentially-created National Data Protection Authority (“ANPD”). 51
Critics argue, however, that because ANPD was created by executive order and
is presidentially supervised, the political interests of Bolsonaro are likely to
influence its decision-making. 52 In matters of internet governance, the influence
of Brazil’s executive branch is an ongoing concern given the deep political
polarization of recent times.
III. POLITICAL POLARIZATION & THE SPREAD OF DISINFORMATION
As noted above, the 2013 spying disclosures by Edward Snowden marked a
geopolitical turning point that provided the Brazilian government with the
political will necessary to enact the MCI. The following year, in 2014, another
issue of transnational concern highlighted the need for data privacy, controlling
the spread of disinformation, and internet governance writ large. That year, a
data profiling company named Cambridge Analytica gained access to the private
data profiles of 50 million Facebook users. 53 Through a seemingly innocuous
offer that paid these users to take a personality quiz, the company was able to
obtain personal data from users’ profiles and those of their Facebook “friends.”54
Unaware that their data had been hijacked, they were also unaware that their
information would be sold to Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and
allegedly used by that campaign to manipulate their voting interests. 55
48. Hunton Andrews Kurth, Brazilian President Delays Applicability of LGPD Sanctions, but
Other Provisions Remain Uncertain, NAT’L. L. REV. (June 17, 2020), https://www.natlawreview
.com/article/brazilian-president-delays-applicability-lgpd-sanctions-other-provisions-remain.
49. Id.
50. Aaron Tantleff et al., Brazilian Government Makes the LGPD Effective Imminently,
NAT’L. L. REV. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/brazilian-governmentmakes-lgpd-effective-imminently.
51. Id.
52. Miguel Rodriguez, The Definitive Guide to Brazil’s Privacy Law, the LGPD, OSANO (Feb.
21, 2021), https://www.osano.com/articles/brazil-lgpd.
53. Zeynep Tufekci, Facebook’s Surveillance Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/facebook-cambridge-analytica.html.
54. Id.
55. Rosenberg et al., supra note 2 (noting how Cambridge Analytica used illicitly obtained
Facebook data to perform “psychographic modeling techniques” on voters in the US and the UK,
which affected their voting behavior).
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Because Facebook records its users’ browsing histories, along with every
click and “like” made on the site, the amount of illicit data collected in this
exercise is troubling. 56 Also troubling is that while this data was apparently used
to influence the U.S. presidential elections, data obtained in a similar fashion
may have also influenced the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections. 57 After
disclosure of the U.S. breach, Brazilian prosecutors revealed that they were
opening an investigation into whether Cambridge Analytica improperly
harvested personal data from millions of Brazilians. 58 Considering that this
improperly obtained data was apparently used to aid Donald Trump’s 2016
presidential bid, 59 and also by the winner of Brazil’s 2018 presidential
elections 60—the far-right Bolsonaro, Cambridge Analytica’s data harvesting
and any corresponding political manipulation that occurred in these countries
are sure to have a profound and lasting impact.
It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that during the time of the Cambridge
Analytica ordeal the Brazilian body politic experienced a sharp political shift to
the right. 61 This era (2013–2016) was marked by great political unrest, which
included extraordinary social movements 62 and frustration over longstanding
political corruption. 63 Within this fragile political climate, right-wing protesters,
activists, and organizers employed disinformation campaigns implemented via
social media platforms (e.g., Facebook and WhatsApp) to mobilize teenagers
and young adults from low-income favelas, 64 among others, to criticize the left
56. See Tufekci, supra note 53.
57. Carole Cadwalladr, Fresh Cambridge Analytica Leak ‘Shows Global Manipulation is Out
of Control’, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/04/cam
bridge-analytica-data-leak-global-election-manipulation.
58. Ricardo Brito, Brazil Prosecutors Open Investigation into Cambridge Analytica, REUTERS
(Mar. 21, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cambridge-analytica-brazil/brazilprosecutors-open-investigation-into-cambridge-analytica-idUSKBN1GX35A.
59. Carole Cadwalladr, Fresh Cambridge Analytica Leak ‘Shows Global Manipulation is Out
of Control’, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/04/cam
bridge-analytica-data-leak-global-election-manipulation.
60. Brito, supra note 58.
61. Vincent Bevins, Revisiting Brazil’s Dizzying Fall Into Far-Right Rule, INTELLIGENCER
(June 26, 2019) https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/06/revisiting-brazils-fall-from-democracyto-far-right-rule.html.
62. June of 2013 marked the beginning of a series of mass protests in Brazil. These protests,
which became known as Jornadas de Junho (June Journeys), consisted of over 2 million people
marching the streets in over 400 Brazilian cities. The protests were the result of city and state
governments across Brazil increasing bus and metro fares. These increases primarily affected the
low-income residents of Brazil’s urban favelas. See Nemer, supra note 1.
63. See Omari, supra note 13, at 278.
64. In the City of Rio de Janeiro alone, approximately 1.5 million people live in favelas, which
are informal, historically low-income communities. Residents of these communities were the
primary beneficiaries of the PT-implemented economic and digital inclusion initiatives intended to
mitigate Brazil’s myriad socioeconomic inequalities. The great irony here is that many of these
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(i.e., Dilma and the PT). 65 According to Brazilian media studies scholar, David
Nemer, these right-wing groups “piggybacked on [Brazil’s] economic and
political crises to expand their reach on Facebook and create an unsustainable
environment of anger and discontent with [the PT].” 66 As underprivileged
Brazilians increasingly gained internet access through smartphones, they also
became subjects of these targeted disinformation campaigns. 67
Amid these online disinformation campaigns, the MCI provides statutory
provisions that apply directly to internet intermediaries. Specifically, Articles 18
and 19 of the MCI extend intermediary liability carveouts for internet service
providers (“ISPs”) and applications. These provisions are similar to § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) 68 in the United States in that they place
civil liability for internet content on internet users, and not on the applications
or ISPs. The MCI’s intermediary liability provisions are intended to safeguard
freedom of expression and prevent censorship. 69 Accordingly, such provisions
allow companies like Facebook to police their own platforms, which is exactly
what Facebook did. In an attempt to combat a coordinated network of
disinformation in Brazil, the social media behemoth purged thousands of pages
and profiles from its site. 70 Undeterred, the right-wing disinformation campaigns
soon migrated to WhatsApp, 71 which provided an ideal alternative platform
because of its widespread use in Brazil and because its end-to-end encryption
ensured that only the intended recipients would receive the contents of the
messages. Such encryption practices made it difficult for the Facebook-owned
WhatsApp to identify these disinformation campaigns. 72

same residents became supporters of the far-right Bolsonaro after being subjected to online
disinformation campaigns.
65. Nemer, supra note 1.
66. Id. at 153.
67. Id.
68. The CDA has been interpreted to mean that operators of internet services shall not be
deemed publishers or distributors of information and thus are not civilly liable for the content of
third parties who use their services. This interpretation creates broad immunity for many internet
service providers operating within the United States. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). Moreover, this provision provides private online platforms (e.g.,
Facebook, Whatsapp, Twitter, etc.) with the ability to self-govern the content that appears on their
sites. Similar to the MCI, the aim of § 230 is to both foster “Good Samaritan” behavior by
encouraging platforms to actively remove offensive content, and to protect the free speech of users
by avoiding censorship. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602 (2018).
69. Jeffrey Omari, Postscript to “Digital Access Amongst the Marginalized: Democracy and
Internet Governance in Rio De Janeiro”, POLAR: POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. (Mar. 16,
2020), https://polarjournal.org/2020/03/16/2020-virtual-edition-on-digital-politics-jeffrey-omari/.
70. Nemer, supra note 1.
71. See, e.g., Nemer, supra note 1; Nemer, supra note 3; Cesarino, supra note 3.
72. Nemer, supra note 1.
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Brazil’s digital disinformation is not merely limited to Facebook and
WhatsApp, however. The online extremism reached such an extent in the
country’s 2018 presidential elections that the Brazilian state intervened by
commissioning an inquiry into such disinformation. 73 The inquiry uncovered a
so-called “hate cabinet” that was commanded by President Bolsonaro’s son,
Carlos. 74 The hate cabinet allegedly oversaw an expansive disinformation
campaign that included a “network of fake news channels, right-wing blogs and
social media profiles aggressively spreading disinformation and threatening
opponents, including via Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and WhatsApp.” 75
With Brazil’s climate of digital malfeasance reaching levels that are clearly
undemocratic, its government is considering legislation to combat these online
harms.
IV. THE “FAKE NEWS” BILL
In response to the country’s toxic environment of online disinformation, the
Brazilian government is currently considering its so-called “Fake News” Bill. 76
Initially approved by the Brazilian Senate in June of 2020, the bill must now be
voted on by the Brazilian Congress before being presented to President
Bolsonaro for final approval. 77 The bill seeks to address the warranted concerns
presented by the inundation of online disinformation and defamatory content
and, if approved, would apply to internet platforms with over 2 million users. 78
As currently constituted, the bill provides a practical example of the challenges
in combating disinformation, propaganda, and defamation in the online realm. 79
Moreover, the bill does little to address the individuals and organizations who
finance the spread of fake news across social media platforms in Brazil. It also
poses threats to the data privacy guidelines of the LGPD, and to the universal
internet access and freedom of association provisions of the MCI.
Article 2 of the draft legislation notes that it must remain in compliance with
both the MCI and the LGPD. 80 However, the bill’s overbreadth and ambiguity
challenge the freedom of expression and privacy safeguards enacted by its
internet governance predecessors. 81 For instance, the bill requires social media
73. Muggah et al., supra note 7.
74. See, e.g., Id.; Patrícia Campos Mello, Brazil’s Troll Army Moves into the Streets, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/opinion/bolsonaro-office-of-hatebrazil.html.
75. Muggah et al., supra note 7.
76. Jeffrey Omari, Undercutting Internet Governance in Brazil, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (July 19,
2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/undercutting-internet-governance-in-brazil/.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Omari, supra note 76.
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platforms to monitor users’ identities by requiring that users provide
identification and a valid mobile phone number. 82 Linking mobile phone
numbers to social media accounts provides the potential for the unauthorized
surveillance of internet users. 83 Additionally, residents of favelas and other
members of Brazil’s vulnerable populations rely heavily on mobile phones to
access the internet. 84 These populations often lack the financial resources to
maintain uninterrupted mobile phone service. 85 By preventing users without
mobile phone accounts from using social networks, the bill would likely impede
internet access for Brazil’s vulnerable populations. Such requirements run
counter to the principles of the MCI, which promote privacy, democracy, and
universal internet access, and also to the safeguards of the LGPD, which seek to
advance data minimization and risk prevention in processing and storing
personal data.
Other provisions are just as troubling. “For example, the Senate-approved
bill orders social media platforms to track and store the chain of forwarded
communications of Brazilian internet users.” 86 As previously noted, these
messaging chains were a major issue in Brazil’s 2018 election cycle when
Bolsonaro supporters mobilized WhatsApp as a tool for spreading
disinformation. 87 The bill’s massive data collection requirements, which would
affect millions of Brazilian internet users, could easily be misused for political
gain, unauthorized surveillance, or to disclose the sensitive communication
details of individuals, groups, and their various associations. Consequently, the
Fake News Bill has stirred considerable controversy in Brazil’s highly charged
political climate. Brazilian critics have argued that the bill would stifle the
principles of free expression and association that are embedded in the MCI, and

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., David Nemer, Online Favela: The Use of Social Media by the Marginalized in
Brazil, 22 INFO. TECH. FOR DEV. 362, 367 (2016).
85. See Omari, supra note 4 (noting how poor and working-class Brazilians often rely on
controversial “zero-rating” promotions, which allow users free access to certain limited internet
services (e.g., streaming videos) or smartphone applications (e.g., WhatsApp)). For a
comprehensive legal analysis on the pros and cons of zero-rating, see BJ Ard, Beyond Neutrality:
How Zero Rating Can (Sometimes) Advance User Choice, Innovation, and Democratic
Participation, 75 MD. L. REV. 984, 988–89 (2016).
86. Omari, supra note 76.
87. Nemer, supra note 3; Cesarino, supra note 3.
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that it does little to protect the values of user privacy granted by the LGPD. 88
As a result, these same critics claim that it would lead to unjust censorship.89
Meanwhile, legal scholars in the United States caution us to be wary of
hiding behind free speech norms when promoting cyber civil rights. 90 Moreover,
these scholars have aptly claimed that proscribing disinformation preserves
online dialogue and promotes a culture of socioeconomic equality. 91 As it
currently stands, however, the “Fake News” Bill remains inconsistent with the
pro-democracy MCI and illustrates the complex challenges of curbing the harms
of online disinformation while maintaining democratic norms in cyberspace.
CONCLUSION
The above sociolegal analysis provides the requisite political and historical
context for understanding Brazil’s recent battle with disinformation and fake
news. While attempting to advance democratic norms for cyberspace, an
underlying concern is the influence of politics in internet legislation and
policymaking. The country’s bedrock internet law, the MCI, was the result of
geopolitical concerns, yet its objective is to promote democracy and mitigate
national issues of socioeconomic inequality. The spread of fake news clearly
compromises these objectives. However, with its identification requirements
and data collection provisions, the Fake News Bill veers away from the
democratic aims of the MCI. These objectives must be taken seriously if the
country truly values alleviating inequalities of power.
The 2018 shift in the Brazilian executive was accompanied by a markedly
different use (and abuse) of social media. 92 This shift shows both the power of
online platforms to influence national elections and the vulnerability these
platforms have to disinformation campaigns. Thus, while legislation combating
the spread of fake news is necessary, the Brazilian government should limit the
influence of the Brazilian executive in matters of internet governance. This
influence is seen in the executive’s broad authority over agencies like ANPD.
Because of Brazil’s highly polarized political climate, the regulatory bodies that
enforce internet legislation should be independently overseen.

88. See, e.g., Diogo Tulio dos Santos, Brazil, Democracy, and the “Fake News” Bill, GLOB.
AM. (Jan. 4, 2021), https://theglobalamericans.org/2021/01/brazil-democracy-and-the-fake-newsbill/; Raphael Tsavkko Garcia, Opinion, Brazil’s “Fake News” Bill Won’t Solve its Misinformation
Problem, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/09/10/1008
254/brazil-fake-news-bill-misinformation-opinion/.
89. Id.
90. Citron, supra note 14, at 67.
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92. See, e.g., Nemer, supra note 3; Cesarino, supra note 3; Muggah et al., supra note 7.
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Finally, the ability to distinguish legitimate online information from
disinformation, propaganda, and fake news remains an ongoing concern. 93 This
fact is especially true for members of Brazil’s vulnerable populations, many of
whom have only recently gained internet access. 94 Indeed, social and economic
inequality affects internet access and inclusion. 95 As legal scholar Olivier
Sylvain reminds us, exclusion from the internet’s affordances is often “the
consequence of material misfortune and disadvantage.” 96 Because Brazil’s
favelas are rife with material misfortune, disadvantage, and inequality, residents
of these communities are likely more susceptible to propaganda and
disinformation, as the manipulation of newly enfranchised internet users
illustrates. Internet laws purporting to advance digital access and inclusion, like
the MCI, should therefore be coupled with grassroots efforts that advance the
digital tools necessary for effective inclusion on digital platforms. In countries
like Brazil, supplementing internet laws with practical social policies that
promote successful digital inclusion is the true path towards cyber civil rights. 97

93. Robert Muggah et al., Misinformation is Threatening Brazil’s Elections, Too, AMERICAS
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